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May It Please the Court: Questions About Policy
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Julie M. Karaba†
ABSTRACT
This Article examines the questions that Supreme Court Justices ask during oral
argument. The authors content-coded questions asked in fifty-three cases argued during
the October 2009, 2010, and 2011 terms—a total of 5,115 questions. They found that the
Justices vary significantly in the extent to which they ask about different aspects of a
case, including threshold issues, precedent, facts, external actors, legal argument, and
policy. They also found that the Justices were more likely to ask policy-oriented
questions in education cases than in constitutional cases that did not arise in a school
setting. The authors included a case study of Camreta v. Greene to illustrate with specific
examples each current Justice's questioning style. The Study concludes that oral
argument plays an important role in the Supreme Court's decision-making process,
giving the Justices the opportunity to ask questions that are of concern to them.
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“Well, the same, it seems to me, would be true, say, for the market in
emergency services: police, fire, ambulance, roadside assistance,
whatever. You don’t know when you’re going to need it; you’re not sure
that you will. But the same is true for health care. . . . So, can the
government require you to buy a cell phone because that would facilitate
responding when you need emergency services? You can just dial 911 no
matter where you are?” – Chief Justice John G. Roberts 1
“Could you define the market—everybody has to buy food sooner or later.
So, you define the market as food; therefore, everybody’s in the market;
therefore, you can make people buy broccoli.” – Justice Antonin Scalia 2
“Assume for the moment that this is unprecedented. This is a step beyond
what our cases have allowed, the affirmative duty to act to go into
commerce. If that is so, do you not have a heavy burden of justification? I
understand that we must presume laws are constitutional, but, even so,
when you are changing the relation of the individual to the government in
this, what we can stipulate is, I think, a unique way, do you not have a
heavy burden of justification to show authorization under the
Constitution?” – Justice Anthony Kennedy 3
“Before you move on, could you express your limiting principle as
succinctly as you possibly can?” – Justice Samuel Alito 4
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Justices of the United States Supreme Court asked the foregoing questions
during oral argument on March 27, 2012, in National Federation of Independent Business
v. Sebelius. 5 The issue before the Court that day was whether the individual mandate
provision of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 6—more commonly known as
1

Transcript of Oral Argument at 5-6, Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012),
available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/11-398-Tuesday.pdf.
March 27, 2012, was the second day of three days of oral argument on the three cases—National
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius; Dep’t of Health and Human Services v. Florida; and
Florida v. Dep’t of Health and Human Services—the Supreme Court consolidated together to rule on
challenges to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.
2
Id. at 13.
3
Id. at 11-12.
4
Id. at 44.
5
132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
6
Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). Although the majority of the ACA has been codified under
Title 42 of the U.S. Code, Chapter 157, Quality Affordable Health Care for All Americans, 42 U.S.C. §§
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the ACA—was within Congress’s regulatory powers. As these questions illustrate, oral
argument before the Supreme Court provides an opportunity for the Justices to probe any
aspect of the case they wish to examine. Justices often express different concerns through
their questioning. As University of Minnesota professor and Supreme Court observer
Timothy Johnson has noted, oral argument affords the Justices a chance to mine for
information on their own terms. 7 During oral argument, attorneys must answer whatever
questions the Justices throw at them—there is no place to hide. This process contrasts
starkly with the litigants’ written briefs, wherein attorneys emphasize (and exclude) what
they choose. 8 Oral argument thereby provides a unique window into the Justices’
analytical styles.
Against that background, this Article argues that the Justices’ questions reflect their
thinking, and that the Justices use oral argument to ask questions about topics that
concern them. Viewing oral argument as revelatory of the Justices’ mindsets spurs many
questions: If the Justices can ask about any feature of the case before them, what types of
questions do they ask? Are certain types of information more important to one Justice
than to another? Given that the Justices have their own personal policy preferences and
political leanings, to what extent do they ask about the implications of their decisions or
broader policy concerns?
This Study attempts to answer those questions. Part II of this Article presents an
overview of previous research that focused on questions asked during oral argument,
including research conducted by Professor Johnson. Inspired by Professor Johnson’s
research, Part III of this Article provides an expanded quantitative content analysis of oral
argument transcripts to identify the types of questions asked by each Justice in fifty-three
recent cases. 9 Part IV examines resulting data to provide a greater understanding of both
the purpose of oral argument and the approach to questioning taken by individual
Justices. The data illustrate how Justices vary in the types of questions they ask and the
extent to which they each focus on policy issues during oral argument. Part V includes an
in-depth analysis of a recent case, Camreta v. Greene. 10 This qualitative analysis includes
specific examples of the types of questions most commonly asked by the current Justices.
Taken together, information from quantitative and qualitative data provide insight into
each Justice’s approach to oral argument and allow for a more nuanced understanding of
the oral argument process.
II.

PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON QUESTIONS ASKED DURING ORAL ARGUMENT

Justices and scholars alike disagree about the importance and function of oral
argument. Justice Clarence Thomas claimed that Justices almost always have their minds

18001-18121 (2012), the individual mandate provision appears in the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. §
5000A (2012).
7
TIMOTHY R. JOHNSON, ORAL ARGUMENTS AND DECISION MAKING ON THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT 13 (Robert J. Spitzer ed., 2004).
8
See id. at 12.
9
Beginning with the October 2006 term, the Court has made the transcripts of oral arguments available to
the public on its website, www.supremecourt.gov, on the same day an argument is heard by the Court. See
infra Part III.A for a description of how these cases were selected.
10
131 S. Ct. 2020 (2011).
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made up before hearing oral argument, 11 which indicates a limited role for oral argument
in the Court’s decision-making process. To that end, Justice Samuel Alito, too, has
described oral argument as being unimportant. 12 In contrast, Professor Lawrence
Wrightsman argued that oral arguments are influential because they allow the Justices to
explore the application of arguments set out in written briefs, and also provide a forum in
which the Justices can communicate with and attempt to sway their colleagues. 13 Former
Justice Harry Blackmun agreed that oral argument is important, explaining, “A good
oralist can add a lot to a case and help us in our later analysis of what the case is all
about. Many times confusion [in the brief] is clarified by what the lawyers have to say.” 14
In light of that disagreement, this Article examines questions asked at oral
argument as a means to explore how Justices use that forum. Professor Timothy
Johnson’s work underscoring the role of oral argument as an information-gathering tool 15
served as the starting point for this Study. Johnson postulated that oral argument provides
a unique opportunity for the Justices to gather information; briefs submitted by the parties
by definition present a one-sided view of the case. 16 To examine the types of questions
asked during oral argument, Johnson developed a coding scheme of six distinct
categories to classify arguments set forth in written briefs and questions asked at oral
argument. 17 He applied that scheme to a random sample of seventy-five cases heard
between 1972 and 1986. 18 Johnson’s scheme included the following content categories:
Policy; External Actors; Precedent; Threshold Issues; Legal Arguments; and Facts. 19
Johnson concluded that oral arguments are an important method by which the Justices
collect information relevant to policy issues. 20 The quantity of Policy questions (42%)
was significantly greater than the number of questions asked about constitutional issues
(Legal Arguments) (10%), Precedent (9%), or Threshold Issues (4%). 21
11

See LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, ORAL ARGUMENTS BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT: AN EMPIRICAL
APPROACH 25 (Ronald Roesch, ed., 2008).
12
Deb Peterson, Supreme Court Justice Samuel Alito Speaks at St. Louis Law Day, STL TODAY, May 16,
2011, http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/columns/deb-peterson/article_873af5a6-8008-11e0-8324001a4bcf6878.html.
13
WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 11, at ix. See also James C. Phillips & Edward L. Carter, Oral Argument in the
Early Roberts Court: A Qualitative and Quantitative Analysis of Individual Justice Behavior, 11 J. APP.
PRAC. & PROCESS 325, 329 (2010).
14
Philippa Strumm, Change and Continuity on the Supreme Court: Conversations with Justice Harry
Blackmun, 34 U. RICH. L. REV. 285, 298-304 (2000). Similarly, Justice Ginsburg commented, “I have seen
few victories snatched at oral argument from a total defeat the judges had anticipated on the basis of the
briefs. But I have seen several potential winners become losers in whole or in part because of clarification
elicited at argument. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks on Appellate Advocacy, 50 S.C. L. REV. 567, 570
(1999).
15
See JOHNSON, supra note 7, at 21-56.
16
Id. at 23-24.
17
Id. at 32-35.
18
Id. at 28-29.
19
Id. at 34-35. Johnson defined “Policy” as “questions about legal principles the Court should adopt,
courses of action the Court should take, or a Justice’s beliefs about the content of public policy.” Id. at 34.
“External Actors” referred to non-parties’ preferences about the outcome of a case, hypothetical questions,
and the potential implications of a decision. Id. “Precedent” referred to previous Court decisions;
“Threshold Issues” included matters such as jurisdiction; “Legal Arguments” included constitutional
provisions; and “Facts” were questions about the facts of what occurred in the case. Id. at 34-35.
20
Id. at 55-56.
21
Id. at 53.
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Apart from Johnson’s study, there has been limited empirical research on the
content of oral argument. 22 One study focused on the role of laughter at the Court. 23
Another analyzed the type of language the Justices use at oral argument. 24 Johnson also
examined whether the quality of a lawyer’s oral argument affected the final judgment on
the merits, finding that it did. 25 Professors James Phillips and Edward Carter examined
how talkative the Justices were during oral argument, and found that the more the
Justices spoke to one party, the less likely they were to vote for that side. 26 These general
empirical studies of oral argument have not specifically addressed the content of
questions asked at oral argument. Thus, this Study aims to analyze the content of those
questions in order to discern the information Justices seek at oral argument.
III.

AN EMPIRICAL STUDY FOCUSED ON POLICY QUESTIONS: METHODOLOGY

This Study expands upon Professor Johnson’s research. Johnson was able to
analyze only aggregate data about the Court. Since 2004, however, the official transcripts
of oral arguments have identified the Justices by name, facilitating examination of each
Justice individually, as well as the Court collectively. This Study examines the types of
questions asked by each Justice and also focuses on whether the Justices differed in the
extent to which they asked questions about policy.
A.

Sample Set

The Sample consisted of fifty-three cases argued during the October 2008, 2009,
and 2010 terms. 27 The cases shared the following criteria: (1) nine Justices were present
for the oral argument; (2) the Court reached a decision in the case (i.e., did not set for reargument or dismiss as improvidently granted); and (3) each case either raised a

22

See, e.g., James C. Phillips & Edward L. Carter, Gender and U.S. Supreme Court Oral Argument on the
Roberts Court: An Empirical Examination, 41 RUTGERS L.J. 613 (2010) (assessing questions on an
information-seeking continuum, and focusing on gender influence on the court); Lee Epstein, William M.
Landes, & Richard A. Posner, Inferring the Winning Party in the Supreme Court from the Pattern of
Questioning at Oral Argument, 39 J. LEGAL STUD. 433 (2010) (finding a correlation between the number of
questions and number of words per question asked of a party at oral argument and the likelihood that the
party will lose the case).
23
See Ryan A. Malphurs, “People Did Sometimes Stick Things in my Underwear” The Function of
Laughter at the U.S. Supreme Court, 10 COMM. L. REV. 48, 48-75 (2011). See also Adam Liptak, A
Taxonomy of Supreme Court Humor, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/25/
us/25bar.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=funniest%20supreme%20court%20Justice&st=cse.
24
See Sarah A. Treul, Ryan C. Black & Timothy R. Johnson, Jekyll and Hyde Questions from the Bench:
Does the Emotional Nature of Supreme Court Justices’ Questions Affect Their Votes on the Merits? 1-28
(May 20, 2009) (unpublished working paper) (previous version of paper was presented at the 2009
meetings of the Midwest Political Science Association in Chicago, Illinois), available at http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1407518.
25
See Timothy R. Johnson, Paul J. Wahlbeck & James F. Spriggs, II, The Influence of Oral Arguments on
the U.S. Supreme Court, 100 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 99, 99-113 (2006).
26
Phillips & Carter, supra note 13, at 388. See also id. at 329-30 (noting other studies that have found the
same correlation). In their study, Phillips and Carter categorized questions as “genuine,” “counterfeit or
pseudo-questions,” and “non-questions.” Id. at 331.
27
A complete list of cases by term is found infra Appendix A.
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constitutional issue, was an education case, or both. 28 The sample included a total of nine
education cases, six of which addressed constitutional issues and three of which
addressed statutory questions. 29
Although the majority of cases the Court decides each year do not involve a
constitutional issue, 30 this Study used cases raising constitutional issues for two reasons.
First, although the Court explores the policy implications of every case, cases requiring
constitutional interpretation allow the Court to map out the law in the first instance. Thus,
constitutional cases are particularly ripe for discussion of the policy implications of the
Court’s decision. In contrast, in cases demanding statutory interpretation, the Court’s task
is to apply the policy that the legislature has already developed. As Supreme Court
journalist Dahlia Lithwick noted, “In many, many ways, this is a policy-setting
institution. They’re not simply common law judges who decide the case in front of
them.” 31 Second, the cases answering constitutional questions are often the cases that
raise the most controversial social issues with the farthest-reaching policy implications.
Education cases were included in this study as an example of a type of case that often
implicates important policy issues that affect a majority of the country. School officials
must make complex judgments about issues such as search and seizure, free speech, and
religious activities at school, and they often make the argument that the Justices should
defer to their (the school officials’) judgments in making school policies. 32 Given this
recurring policy argument, the authors wondered whether the Justices would be more or
less likely to ask policy questions in this category of cases as compared to constitutional
cases.

28

“Education case” was defined as either arising from a dispute in a school setting or concerning an
educational issue.
29
The education cases were the following:
2008 Term
• Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass’n, 555 U.S. 353 (2009) (First Amendment issue).
• Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 555 U.S. 246 (2009) (Title IX issue in K-12 school setting).
• Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433 (2009) (funding for English Language Learner programs under Equal
Educational Opportunities Act).
• Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364 (2009) (Fourth Amendment issue).
• Forest Grove v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230 (2009) (issue under the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act).
2009 Term
• Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of Law v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971
(2010) (First Amendment issue).
2010 Term
• J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011) (application of Miranda rights in school setting).
• Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436 (2011) (Establishment Clause issue).
• Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020 (2011) (Fourth Amendment issue).
30
In 2007, for example, Baum reports that 73% of the cases had no constitutional issue decided.
LAWRENCE BAUM, THE SUPREME COURT 157 (10th ed. 2010).
31
Digital recording: Bob Edwards Weekend, Sirius XM Satellite Radio (May 29, 2010) (on file with
author).
32
See, e.g., Brief for National School Boards Association and American Association of School
Administrators as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 18-19, Safford, 557 U.S. 364 (No. 08-479), 2009
WL 641332, at *18-19.
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B.

Expanding the Policy Question Category

In this Study, every question asked during oral argument was coded using a
modified version of Johnson’s categories. 33 This Study also looked more closely at
different types of policy questions, whereas Johnson employed one general Policy
category. To provide additional insight into the Justices’ concerns, this Study divided the
Policy category into four sub-categories. When a Justice asked a hypothetical question or
a question about an extension or application of the decision, the question was considered
a policy question and was labeled Policy A. Johnson included these questions in his
“External Actors” category, but not every such question actually referred to the impact on
or preference of external actors; in this Study, only questions that directly asked about
such an impact were coded as “External Actors.”
This Study further divided Johnson’s Policy category into three other parts:
questions about legal principles that the Court should adopt were coded Policy B;
questions about courses of action that the Court should take were coded Policy C; and
questions that revealed a Justice’s beliefs about the content of public policy were coded
Policy D. Finally, in this Study, questions were not double coded into two separate
categories (as they were in Johnson’s study).
An example of each type of question is set out below:
Code
Threshold
Questions that ask about whether the Court should
hear the case (e.g., whether the case is moot)

Precedent
Questions that ask specifically about a prior case

Facts
Questions about what happened leading to the case
being argued

33

Example
“It takes two to tango, and a case or controversy
requires somebody on the other side who cares a fig
about the outcome. And here, S.G., . . . the young
woman affected in the case, has moved to another
state . . . making it virtually certain that she’ll never
confront this situation again.” 34
“But in Flast—I’ve looked at it again briefly, and it
seemed to use that wonderfully precise word
‘nexus.’” 35
“Was there prior experience in this particular
school? Were there prior occasions on which
students had been strip-searched and contraband
found?” 36

A copy of the coding guidelines is included infra Appendix B. Three independent coders coded each
question. If there was any disagreement among the three coders, a fourth coder made the final decision
about the appropriate category for that question.
34
Transcript of Oral Argument at 6-7, Camreta, 131 S. Ct. 2020 (No. 09-1454) [hereinafter Camreta Oral
Argument].
35
Transcript of Oral Argument at 55-56, Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org., 131 S. Ct. 1436 (No. 09-987).
36
Transcript of Oral Argument at 5, Safford, 557 U.S. 364 (No. 08-479).
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External Actors
Questions about how a decision in the case being
argued affects outside parties, such as school
officials or Congress

Legal Argument
Questions about petitioner/respondent’s argument in
the case before the Court
Policy A
Hypothetical questions or questions about extension
or application of the decision

Policy B
Questions about legal principles that the Court
should adopt

Policy C
Questions about the course of action the Court
should take

Policy D
Questions that reveal a Justice’s beliefs about the
content of public policy

[2012
“Okay. But I think we’ve got to assume that
Congress had some concern for the parents who
correctly say, this IEP is no good, it just can’t be
done in the school system and the kid needs a
special school. In that case . . . your answer may be
that’s the exceptional case and it shouldn’t drive
[the] inferences to be drawn about congressional
intent. But in that case, if the district and the parents
are at good faith loggerheads, it can go on for a
long, long time, can’t it?” 37
“In other words, you agree with Justice Kagan’s
criticism of those cases, and you said, yes, she’s
right; those cases were wrongly decided.” 38
“But . . . if we hold in your favor in this case and the
next school district says, all right, we’re going to
have classes in body cavity searches, then there
would be no legal basis, if we accept your principle,
for saying that’s out of bounds as a matter of the
Fourth Amendment, isn’t that correct?” 39
“And there are differences. Some 15-year-olds
know a lot more than some 17-year-olds, and so on.
And . . . the facts that you’re concerned about all go
into the voluntariness inquiry, which is still
pertinent after Miranda. Why don’t we just put
those facts into that inquiry and say, look, we’ve got
one strict rule; everybody knows it, you hear it on
TV all the time, people are given Miranda
warnings; that part of it is done?” 40
“There certainly, I would think, would be a problem
if the right-to-work people can get there. And you
are not going to let the unions get there. But I don’t
know the facts. So shouldn’t we just send this case
back and say: Please look at what the situation
is?” 41
“We don’t want Miranda warnings to be given
where they are unnecessary because they are only
necessary to prevent coercion, and where there’s no
coercion, we want confessions, don’t we? And the
Miranda warnings deter confessions.” 42

37

Transcript of Oral Argument at 11-12, Forest Grove, 557 U.S. 230 (No. 08-305) (finding that under the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), Forest Grove School District was required to
reimburse T.A. for private special education services, in spite of the fact that T.A. had not previously
received special education services at the public school, because the public school failed to provide free
appropriate public education (FAPE) and the private school placement was appropriate).
38
Transcript of Oral Argument at 12, Ariz. Christian, 131 S. Ct. 1436 (No. 09-987).
39
Transcript of Oral Argument at 18, Safford, 557 U.S. 364 (No. 08-479).
40
Id. at 14.
41
Transcript of Oral Argument at 10-11, Ysursa, 555 U.S. 353 (No. 07-869) (finding for the state in a First
Amendment challenge to an Idaho state law banning public employee payroll deductions for political
activities).
42
Transcript of Oral Argument at 51-52, J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. 2394 (09-11121).
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IV.

FINDINGS

A. Frequency Data
The fifty-three cases included a total of 5115 questions. Questions asked in
education cases (1084) constituted 21.2% of the total, while questions asked in noneducation cases (4031) constituted 78.8%. The data regarding individual Justices set out
below include statistics for retired Justices Stevens and Souter. The remainder of this
Analysis, however, will focus only on the current members of the Court.
Table 1

Justice

Number of
Questions Asked
(% of total in
Sample) 43

Number of Cases in which
Justice participated

Average Number of
Questions Per Case

Antonin Scalia

1003 (19.6%)

53

18.9

John G. Roberts

798 (15.6%)

53

15.1

Ruth Bader Ginsburg

634 (12.4%)

53

12.0

Stephen Breyer

627 (12.3%)

53

11.8

Anthony Kennedy

520 (10.2%)

53

9.8

Samuel Alito

409 (8.0%)

53

7.7

John Paul Stevens

345 (6.7%)

40

8.6

Sonia Sotomayor

322 (6.3%)

29

11.1

David Souter

342 (6.7%)

24

14.25

Elena Kagan

115 (2.2%)

13

8.8

Clarence Thomas

0

53

0.0

These findings are consistent with previous research that found Justice Antonin
Scalia to be a very active questioner, 44 and the widely reported fact that Justice Clarence
Thomas has not asked a question during oral argument since February 22, 2006. 45
43

All percentages from this Study have been rounded to the nearest tenth of one percent.
See Phillips & Carter, supra note 13, at 353-54; Joan Biskupic, Roberts, Scalia Strike Similar Chords on
Court, USA TODAY, Apr. 10, 2007, http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2007-04-09-robertsscalia_N.htm; SCOTUSBLOG, STAT PACK FOR OCTOBER TERM 2010 FINAL 15 (2011), available at
http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/SB_OT10_stat_pack_final.pdf [hereinafter
SCOTUSBLOG STAT PACK OT2010]. SCOTUSblog reports the following average number of questions per
Justice per case for the October 2010 term:
Scalia: 25.8
Breyer: 20.3
Sotomayor: 19.2
Roberts: 18.2
Ginsburg: 14.0
Alito: 12.1
Kennedy: 11.0
44
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B.

Justices’ Concern with Policy

Consistent with Johnson’s findings, 46 36.1% of the Justices’ questions in this Study
were about Policy. Of the 5115 total questions, 1848 questions concerned Policy, while
the remaining 3267 questions fell under the other five content categories. Additionally,
Justices varied in their focus on Policy. As a percentage of the Justice’s total number of
questions asked, Justice Alito asked the highest number of Policy questions of any
current Justice (46.4% of his questions concerned Policy). Justice Ginsburg asked the
lowest number of Policy questions (20% of her questions). 47 This difference is
statistically significant. 48 Data regarding all of the current Justices’ Policy questions are
set out below:
Table 2
Justice

Percentage of Justice’s Questions
That Concerned Policy

Samuel Alito

46.4%

Stephen Breyer

42.8%

Anthony Kennedy

41.6%

Elena Kagan

36.6%

John G. Roberts

35.9%

Antonin Scalia

34.3%

Sonia Sotomayor

27.0%

Ruth Bader Ginsburg

20.0%

Clarence Thomas

0.0%

Kagan: 10.6
Thomas: 0
Id. These data also show that this bench is extremely “hot,” with the Justices actively engaged in
questioning and with Justice Sotomayor especially becoming a more active questioner over the past two
terms. SCOTUSblog’s Stat Pack for the October 2011 Term lists Justice Sotomayor as the second most
active questioner in terms of average number of questions per case, behind only Justice Scalia.
SCOTUSBLOG, STAT PACK FOR OCTOBER TERM 2011 FINAL 18 (2012), available at
http://dailywrit.com/blog/uploads/2012/06/SCOTUSblog_Stat_Pack_OT11_final.pdf. According to
SCOTUSblog, she asked an average of 21.3 questions per case in OT 2011, id., and 19.2 questions per case
in OT 2010. In our Sample, in contrast, Justice Sotomayor asked an average of 11.1 questions per case. See
supra Table 1.
45
See, e.g., Adam Liptak, No Argument: Thomas Keeps 5-Year Silence, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/13/us/13thomas.html.
46
See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
47
Excluding Justice Thomas, who did not ask any questions in the entirety of this sample.
48 2
c (9, N=5115)=117.22, p = .00. Statistical significance levels indicate how likely it is that a reported
result is due to chance. Here, with a significance level (p) of less than .01, there is a greater than 99%
probability that the results are true and not the result of chance.
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Individual Justices’ Concerns 49

C.

1. Chief Justice John G. Roberts
Content
Percentage of Justice’s Total Questions
Category
Threshold
0.1%
Precedent
1.0%
Facts
7.0%
External Actors
0.5%
Legal
55.5%
Policy (Total)
35.9%
Policy A (hypothetical)
20.2%
Policy B (legal principle)
4.3%
Policy C (action)
3.1%
Policy D (belief)
8.3%

The Chief Justice was the second most active questioner in this Study, positing 15.6% of
the total questions. 50 Like his colleagues, the Chief Justice was more likely to ask about
Legal Arguments than about any other topic. When questioning about Policy, the Chief
Justice most often focused on hypothetical applications of the case at hand (Policy A);
20.2% of his questions fell into that sub-category. He asked more Policy A questions than
any of the Associate Justices. 51
2. Justice Antonin Scalia
Content
Percentage of Justice’s Total Questions
Category
Threshold
0.3%
Precedent
0.0%
Facts
8.5%
External Actors
0.4%
Legal
56.6%
Policy (Total)
34.3%
Policy A (hypothetical)
14.8%
Policy B (legal principle)
3.1%
Policy C (action)
3.3%
Policy D (belief)
13.1%

Justice Scalia was the most active questioner at oral arguments in the Sample, posing
19.6% of the total questions asked. 52 He asked far more questions about advocates’ Legal
Arguments than any other type of question. Among his colleagues, Justice Scalia was the
Justice most likely to ask a Policy D question, contributing 27.8% of the Court’s total
49

Justices listed in order of seniority.
See supra Table 1.
51
See supra Appendix C, Table 6.
52
See supra Table 1.
50
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questions that reveal the questioner’s views about public policy issues (amounting to just
over 13% of his own questions). 53 As the longest-serving Justice currently on the Court,
Justice Scalia is well known for his aggressive and active style on the bench. 54 His
willingness to reveal his policy opinions through his questions may be a function of his
years of experience as a member of the Court as well as of his personality.
3. Justice Anthony Kennedy
Content
Percentage of Justice’s Total Questions
Category
Threshold
0.0%
Precedent
1.0%
Facts
4.8%
External Actors
0.8%
Legal
51.9%
Policy (Total)
41.6%
Policy A (hypothetical)
18.7%
Policy B (legal principle)
6.0%
Policy C (action)
3.8%
Policy D (belief)
13.1%

Compared to the other Justices, Justice Kennedy asked the second highest percentage of
Policy D questions (after Justice Scalia), those expressing his own views about Policy. 55
He was most interested in asking questions about the Legal Argument, then asking
hypothetical questions (Policy A), but also concerned about Precedent (he ranked third
among all Justices in that category). 56 Justice Kennedy is often described as the swing
vote on the Court, 57 and interestingly, these data show Justice Kennedy in the middle of
the Justices on almost every measure, both in terms of frequency of questions and in
percentage of questions asked. Justice Kennedy ranked fifth in the frequency of
questions, and fifth in asking about each of these topics: Facts, Legal Arguments,
hypothetical questions (Policy A), and legal principles that the Court should adopt
(Policy B). 58 This indicates that Justice Kennedy may be using oral argument as an
opportunity to assess his colleagues’ positions, listening more than questioning, but still
willing to reveal his policy preferences on occasion.

53

See infra Appendix C, Table 9.
See, e.g., JEFFREY ROSEN, THE SUPREME COURT 199-200 (2006) (describing Justice Scalia’s “tendency to
dominate oral argument with aggressive questions and showy put-downs”).
55
See infra Appendix C, Table 9.
56
See infra Appendix C, Table 2.
57
See, e.g., Massimo Calabrese & David Von Drehle, What Will Justice Kennedy Do?, TIME, June 18,
2012, at 28, 31; Phillips & Carter, supra note 13, at 361-62; ROSEN, supra note 54, at 235; SCOTUSBLOG
STAT PACK OT2010, supra note 44, at 10, 12 (reporting Justice Kennedy in the majority in 94% of cases
and 88% of the time in cases decided by a five-to-four vote).
58
See infra Appendix C, Table 3 (Facts), Table 5 (Legal Arguments), Table 6 (Policy A) & Table 7 (Policy
B).
54
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4. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg
Content
Percentage of Justice’s Total Questions
Category
Threshold
0.6%
Precedent
1.4%
Facts
16.7%
External Actors
0.6%
Legal
60.7%
Policy (Total)
20.0%
Policy A (hypothetical)
11.7%
Policy B (legal principle)
3.2%
Policy C (action)
2.1%
Policy D (belief)
3.0%

Justice Ginsburg is unusual in that she asked more questions than any other Justice in
three different question categories: Threshold, Precedent, and Facts. 59 In the Policy
category, however, she asked the lowest percentage of questions of all her colleagues (not
including Justice Thomas). 60
As shown in the table above, the majority of Justice Ginsburg’s questions
concerned Legal Arguments. Her second most prevalent area of interest was clarifying
the Facts in each particular case. Justice Ginsburg seems to approach questioning during
oral argument in a traditional, lawyer-like fashion: she is most likely to ask about the
predicate issues and then probe for additional facts. She will challenge the lawyers to
clarify and justify their legal arguments but is less likely to examine the policy
implications of the case.
5. Justice Stephen Breyer
Content
Percentage of Justice’s Total Questions
Category
Threshold
0.0%
Precedent
0.5%
Facts
6.2%
External Actors
0.3%
Legal
50.1%
Policy (Total)
42.8%
Policy A (hypothetical)
22.3%
Policy B (legal principle)
6.2%
Policy C (action)
4.6%
Policy D (belief)
9.7%

Justice Breyer was most concerned with questions regarding Legal Arguments,
dedicating half of his questions to that topic. He was the second most likely Justice to ask
59
60

See infra Appendix C, Table 1 (Threshold), Table 2 (Precedent), & Table 3 (Facts).
See supra Table 2.
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about Policy, asking 42.8% of the Court’s total Policy questions in the Sample. 61 When
doing so, Justice Breyer focused first on Policy A questions (hypothetical situations and
the application of the Court’s decision to future cases). Of all the Justices, he asked the
most Policy B questions, probing for answers about legal principles that the Court should
adopt. 62 Justice Breyer seems to use oral argument as an opportunity to work through
both the legal arguments and policy issues of a case, asking the attorneys to help him
clarify his ideas while also examining the many policy implications of a decision.
6. Justice Samuel Alito
Content
Percentage of Justice’s Total Questions
Category
Threshold
0.0%
Precedent
0.2%
Facts
3.7%
External Actors
0.0%
Legal
49.6%
Policy (Total)
46.4%
Policy A (hypothetical)
33.5%
Policy B (legal principle)
4.9%
Policy C (action)
2.4%
Policy D (belief)
5.6%

With the exception of Justice Thomas, Justice Alito was the least active questioner during
oral argument. 63 When he did ask a question, however, he was most likely to focus on
Legal Arguments. Justice Alito was the Justice most concerned with Policy. 64 The data
show that about one-third of Justice Alito’s questions posited a hypothetical or inquired
about the extension or application of the Court’s decision (Policy A). Justice Alito,
though, was not likely to explore the other policy implications of a case (e.g., only 4.9%
of his questions focused on principles that the Court should adopt (Policy B) and only
2.4% explored courses of action that the court should take (Policy C)). He was very
unlikely to ask a Threshold question or a question about Precedent.

61

See id.
See infra Appendix C, Table 7.
63
See supra Table 1.
64
See supra Table 2.
62
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7. Justice Sonia Sotomayor
Content
Percentage of Justice’s Total Questions
Category
Threshold
0.3%
Precedent
0.3%
Facts
2.5%
External Actors
0.3%
Legal
69.6%
Policy (Total)
27.0%
Policy A (hypothetical)
14.6%
Policy B (legal principle)
4.7%
Policy C (action)
3.7%
Policy D (belief)
4.0%

Compared with the other Justices, Justice Sotomayor was unlikely to ask any questions
about Facts or External Actors, or to express her own view on Policy (Policy D). 65 The
vast majority of her questions concerned Legal Arguments.
Justice Sotomayor participated in only twenty-nine of the fifty-three cases in
this Sample, reflecting her role as the second most junior Justice. Only Justice Kagan
asked a smaller percentage of Policy D questions (expressing her own views), a finding
that is unsurprising given the fact that these two Justices have the least experience on the
Court.
8. Justice Elena Kagan
Content
Percentage of Justice’s Total Questions
Category
Threshold
0.9%
Precedent
0.0%
Facts
0.9%
External Actors
0.0%
Legal
61.7%
Policy (Total)
36.6%
Policy A (hypothetical)
23.5%
Policy B (legal principle)
9.6%
Policy C (action)
0.0%
Policy D (belief)
3.5%

Legal questions were Justice Kagan’s primary focus, constituting over 60% of her total
questions. Almost none of her questions concerned Threshold, Precedent, Facts, or
External Actors (which together equaled only 1.8% of her total). When she did ask
questions about Policy, Justice Kagan concentrated on exploring how the decision might
be extended (Policy A). It is important to note that Justice Kagan participated in just
thirteen cases in this Sample, so these results have less reliability than those of her more
65

See infra Appendix C, Table 3 (Facts), Table 4 (External Actors), & Table 9 (Policy D).
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experienced colleagues. It is too early in her tenure on the Court to know whether Justice
Kagan’s questioning style will remain in this pattern or will evolve as she gains more
experience on the bench.
D.

Policy Questions in Education Cases

The Justices in this Study, as demonstrated by the data, ask more Policy questions
in education cases than in non-education constitutional cases. This difference is
statistically significant. 66 Further research must be conducted to determine if this pattern
holds for other predictably policy-heavy types of cases (e.g., criminal cases, immigration
proceedings, or redistricting laws) but it does show that the Justices are especially
focused on the policy implications of their decisions in cases involving public schools.
The Court clearly does not automatically defer to the judgment of school administrators.
In fact, in the three K-12 education cases in the Sample in which a school district was a
party, the Court ruled against the district in each case. 67
Table 3: Policy Questions in Education Cases
Type of Case
Education
Non-Education

V.

Number of Questions
1084
4031

Percentage of Questions
Concerned with Policy
41.1%
34.8%

CASE STUDY: QUESTIONS DURING ORAL ARGUMENT IN CAMRETA V. GREENE 68

Taken together, the data from this Study illustrate what happens at oral argument.
The data show that the Justices each ask different types of questions, that they focus on
policy questions to different degrees, and that collectively they ask more questions about
policy in education cases than in non-education constitutional cases. How, though, do
these differences translate into describing the Justices’ individual behavior during oral
argument? A qualitative analysis of Camreta v. Greene, 69 a recent education case,
provides a detailed and concrete example of how the Justices actually use oral argument
to gather information and communicate their concerns with the parties and their
colleagues. This case study also shows how these different approaches allow the Justices
to collectively clarify facts, examine the legal issues at hand, and explore the implications
of a given decision for public policy.

66

c2(1, N=5115)=14.44, p = .00.
The nine education cases can be grouped as follows: (a) Cases in which a K-12 school district was a
party (three cases: Fitzgerald, 555 U.S. at 246; Safford, 557 U.S. at 364; and Forest Grove, 557 U.S. at
230); (b) Cases involving an institution of higher education (one case: Christian Legal Soc’y, 130 S. Ct. at
2971); (c) Cases that involved an education issue but in which a school district was not a party (five cases:
Ysursa, 555 U.S. at 353; Horne, 557 U.S. at 433; Arizona Christian, 131 S. Ct. at 1436; J.D.B., 131 S. Ct.
at 2394; and Camreta, 131 S. Ct. at 2020).
68
131 S. Ct. 2020 (2011).
69
Id.
67
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A. Background on Camreta v. Greene

Camreta v. Greene (with Alford v. Greene) was argued on March 1, 2011. The case
involved allegations that a man, Nimrod Greene, sexually abused his young daughter,
referred to as S.G. 70 Petitioners Bob Camreta, an investigator with the Oregon
Department of Human Services, and Deputy Sheriff James Alford went to 9-year-old
S.G.’s elementary school to interview her about the allegations of abuse. 71 When they
arrived at the school, a guidance counselor took S.G. out of class, explaining that some
people needed to talk to her, and left S.G. with Camreta and Alford for a period of up to
two hours. 72
S.G.’s mother, Sarah Greene, filed a Section 1983 73 lawsuit alleging that petitioners
Camreta and Alford violated S.G.’s Fourth Amendment rights when they seized and
interviewed her without a warrant and without her mother’s consent or presence. 74 A
federal district court granted summary judgment to the petitioners. 75 On appeal, the Ninth
Circuit held that S.G.’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated when she was seized and
interrogated in the absence of a warrant, a court order, exigent circumstances, or probable
cause. 76 The Ninth Circuit also held, however, that the law concerning in-school seizures
was not “clearly established,” and thus held that the petitioners were entitled to the
protection of qualified immunity. 77
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address two questions: (1) whether the
Ninth Circuit’s ruling was reviewable given that the petitioners had prevailed on grounds
of qualified immunity; and (2) whether the Ninth Circuit correctly determined that the
interview violated S.G.’s Fourth Amendment rights. 78
Although the school district was not a party to this case, the case as a whole raised
significant policy issues for schools in general. The National School Boards Association
(NSBA) filed an amicus brief addressing its concerns. 79 First, the NSBA argued that the
concept of a “seizure” under Fourth Amendment law had developed in the law
enforcement context and should not apply in the school setting, where children already
lack the right to come and go at will. 80 Second, it urged that requiring school personnel to
be the gatekeepers in such situations would put them in the untenable position of having
70

Id. at 2027.
Id.
72
Greene v. Camreta, 588 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 2009). The parties disagreed about the length of time
and the interview was not recorded. Id.
73
See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).
74
Camreta, 131 S. Ct. at 2027.
75
Id.
76
Greene, 588 F.3d at 1030.
77
Id. at 1031-33.
78
Camreta, 131 S. Ct. at 2026. The case was decided on May 26, 2011. Id. at 2020. Justice Kagan
delivered the opinion for the seven-member majority, with Justices Kennedy and Thomas dissenting. Id.
The Court ruled only on the first question posed. Id. at 2026. Justice Kagan wrote, “We conclude that this
Court generally may review a lower court’s constitutional ruling at the behest of a government official
granted immunity. But we may not do so in this case for reasons peculiar to it.” Id. According to the Court,
the case was moot because the child involved (S.G.) grew up and moved away from Oregon; therefore, it
could not reach the merits of the Fourth Amendment question. Id.
79
See Brief for National School Boards Association et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 2,
Camreta, 131 S. Ct. 2020 (Nos. 09-1454, 09-1478), 2010 WL 5168881, at *2.
80
Id. at 5-8.
71
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to evaluate whether law enforcement officials and caseworkers had the legal justification
to question students. 81 School personnel, the NSBA argued, do not have the training to
make such judgments and even if training could be provided, doing so might place them
in direct conflict with the law in every state that requires them to report evidence of
sexual abuse. 82
B. Questions During Oral Argument
With the exception of Justice Thomas, every current Justice asked questions during
the oral argument (reaching a cumulative total of 125 questions). The vast majority of
Chief Justice Roberts’s questions fell into the Legal Argument category (17 of 22 total),
probing the basis of each party’s position about the Court’s decision to accept the case.
For instance, he inquired of the respondent, “I’m sorry. Again, I get to the question, why
do you care? Why do you care whether we vacate [the] order or not? Your position is
your client has no continuing interest in the case.” 83 This was consistent with the overall
Sample data, which showed that more than half of the Chief Justice’s questions were
about Legal Arguments. 84
Also, consistent with the overall findings, 85 Chief Justice Roberts’s Policy
questions focused on the effects of the outcome in Camreta and hypothetical future cases
(4 of his 22 total questions during the argument). Chief Justice Roberts asked the
petitioner (Camreta) several Policy A questions. For example, the Chief Justice asked:
[Y]ou think it would be a different rule if we’re talking about some other
criminal activity? The father’s selling drugs, and you think the child might
have some evidence or at least be willing to talk about that. Do you need
anything other than reasonableness in that case? 86
It is possible that the Chief Justice considered it his responsibility to guide the direction
of oral argument, and for that reason he focused primarily on Legal Argument questions.
Although the Chief Justice is not generally overly concerned with exploring policy
issues, he was even less so in this case. In Camreta, 22.7% of his questions were about
Policy, whereas, overall, 35.9% of his questions fell into that category. 87
The data from the overall Sample show that Justice Scalia was the most active
questioner (asking 19.6% of all questions in the Sample), 88 but he was even more active
than average here, asking 25% of the 125 questions in the case. In the aggregate, Justice
Scalia was by far the most vocal about his opinions regarding the content of public
policy, asking nearly 28% of the Policy D questions in the Sample. 89 This was
exemplified in Camreta, where he commented to the respondent:

81

Id. at 11-12.
Id. at 12-14.
83
Camreta Oral Argument, supra note 34, at 29.
84
See infra Appendix C, Table 5.
85
See infra Appendix C, Table 6.
86
Camreta Oral Argument, supra note 34, at 15.
87
See supra Table 2.
88
See supra Table 1.
89
See infra Appendix C, Table 9.
82
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I don’t understand. It seems like a very strange rule to me. You mean it’s
okay for a child protection worker to just ask the child passing in the hall .
. . or not passing in the hall . . . [c]ome into this room, I have a question
for you: Has your father been abusing you? And if the child says yes,
thank you, and the child goes, then that’s okay? 90
Justice Scalia most often asked questions seeking clarification about the attorneys’ Legal
Arguments. 91 Many of Justice Scalia’s legal inquiries disclosed his opinions of those
arguments, in a fashion similar to his Policy D questions. In Camreta he told the
respondent’s lawyer:
It will be something that could be replicated again in the future for some
other reason. [It] isn’t true that it will just eliminate the whole purpose of
our . . . jurisprudence in this area. In many cases [the] decision below can
be appealed, [and] we will rule [on the] constitutional question. 92
Justice Scalia did not hold back at oral argument, which made it seem as though he
viewed the argument as an opportunity to make his colleagues and the attorneys aware of
his thinking. He made it clear when he agreed or disagreed with an attorney, and was
candid about his opinions on the policy implications of the Court’s decisions.
Consistent with the overall data, 93 Justice Kennedy did not ask a Threshold or
Precedent question in Camreta. Instead, he asked questions that required the lawyers to
define or even concede weaknesses of their positions on the legal issues. The following
question was typical: “[W]e’re getting to the merits. Do you agree that . . . the seizure
under the Fourth Amendment is the relevant category here?” 94
Justice Kennedy asked the third highest percentage of Policy questions, 95 focusing
especially on the implications of the Court’s decision (Policy A) or expressing his own
views (Policy D). 96 His questions in Camreta, three out of fourteen of which concerned
Policy, illustrated this approach. Justice Kennedy explored the implications of a Supreme
Court decision to vacate the ruling below asking, “Well, but Justice Alito’s question 97
was addressed to the Ninth Circuit. In the Ninth Circuit, it’s not going to come up again if
we assume that our public employees are going to be law-abiding. They’re bound by this
in the Ninth Circuit.” 98 He also expressed his concern that a Supreme Court decision that
vacated the Ninth Circuit ruling below would cause problems for law enforcement
officers, stating:
It seems to me that it would affect Camreta’s behavior and that of other
child protective officers. The lawyer would explain: Now, legally this is
90

Camreta Oral Argument, supra note 34, at 34.
See infra Appendix C, Table 5.
92
Camreta Oral Argument, supra note 34, at 48.
93
See infra Appendix C, Table 1 (Threshold) & Table 2 (Precedent).
94
Camreta Oral Argument, supra note 34, at 16.
95
See supra Table 2.
96
See supra Part IV.C.3.
97
Justice Alito’s question was addressed to the Respondent’s attorney, asking why the Ninth Circuit’s
decision should not be reviewed on the merits. See Camreta Oral Argument, supra note 34, at 29-30.
98
Id. at 31.
91

107

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY

[2012

not binding; it just never happened. But three judges of the court of
appeals in a reasoned decision have explained why this is contrary to the
Constitution, and it would seem to me that any conscientious law
enforcement officer [would] take that seriously into account. 99
The data suggest that Justice Kennedy regards oral argument as a dynamic process.
He was actively engaged with the lawyers in defining the foundation and limits of their
arguments. He was very willing to consider policy arguments, and willing to express his
own views about policy.
Justice Ginsburg asked the highest percentages of Threshold, Precedent, and Fact
questions (just as she did in the overall Sample), 100 and in this case 33% of her fifteen
questions fell into one of these three categories. In Camreta, her first question was a
Threshold question about mootness: “Why would he face liability?” 101 Her second
question explored this issue further, examining whether the merits would be best
addressed in a case of this procedural posture: “Because in this case, we have a plaintiff
who is not going to be confronted with this situation again and who has put herself out of
the running for damages because she didn’t . . . challenge the qualified immunity
ruling.” 102
Justice Ginsburg did not ask any Precedent questions in Camreta, but she did
clarify facts, inquiring:
[W]hat has Oregon done in response to this Ninth Circuit decision? Before
it said that the caseworkers could have this kind of interview with [the]
child where there was a suspicion of abuse. Was there any change in
practice in Oregon in response to the Ninth Circuit’s decision? 103
She also intervened near the end of the Deputy Solicitor General’s argument on behalf of
the petitioner to ask that she address the legal issues: “You have very limited time. Could
you . . . go to the merits of the Fourth Amendment question and give us the
Government’s position on that?” 104 Justice Ginsburg asked very few Policy questions, but
when she did so, the question was a Policy A inquiry, posing a hypothetical about the
limits of the decision: “Suppose we take the sheriff, the deputy sheriff, out. The only one
who comes to the school and asks to talk to this child is the caseworker from the
department of health?” 105
As noted above, Justice Ginsburg approached oral argument in a very “lawyerly”
fashion. 106 She asked four Threshold questions, to ensure that the underlying legal
requirements were met, and then gathered facts that may not have been included in the
briefs. She was not likely to directly challenge the arguing attorneys about their legal
arguments, but, rather, asked them to clarify their points. For example, she asked the
99

Id. at 23-24.
See infra Appendix C, Table 1 (Threshold), Table 2 (Precedent) & Table 3 (Facts).
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Camreta Oral Argument, supra note 34, at 6.
102
Id. at 8.
103
Id. at 14.
104
Id. at 24.
105
Id. at 39.
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See supra Part IV.C.4.
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respondent, “Where are you reading in the holding of the court of appeals? Because I was
under the impression that they did say there’s only three ways: One is you get a warrant;
another is you get parental consent; and a third is exigent circumstances. I thought that
was [the] ruling of law by the Ninth Circuit.” 107 She did not explore policy concerns in
any detail and did not express her opinions or views about policy.
Justice Breyer was the fourth most-active questioner at oral argument in the
Study. 108 He was atypically quiet in Camreta, asking only thirteen questions in total, not
asking the petitioner any questions, and speaking for the first time on page 41 of the
58-page transcript. 109 Justice Breyer asked the second highest number of Policy questions
in the overall Sample, 110 and when doing so he focused first on Policy A questions
regarding the impact of the case’s outcome. 111 In Camreta, eight of his thirteen questions
fell into this category, such as, “Suppose that we dismiss the case as improvidently
granted, while indicating in an opinion some of the questions that we find difficult such,
for example, as the seizure question, et cetera; what kind of impact would that have in
your opinion?” 112
Justice Breyer’s questions frequently revealed frustration about the lack of lucidity
in the parties’ positions, in that he often asked a series of questions pushing for clarity. In
Camreta, for example, he probed, “Same circumstance. Was there a seizure? No—no
professor—no policeman? . . . School nurse? . . . Seizure? . . . And so, it’s not a seizure if
exactly the same thing happens but there is no outside person there, but it is a seizure if
there’s an outside person?” 113 Justice Breyer’s questions often probed the policy
implications of a decision. That was true in Camreta, when he asked the attorney for the
respondent, “Yes, if—while indicating the reasons being in part that there are difficult
questions here, suggesting what they are. What . . . impact would that have?” 114
The data in this Study showed that Justice Alito asked the fewest questions after
Justice Thomas, 115 and in Camreta he asked only ten of the Court’s 125. While the bulk
of Justice Alito’s questions usually concerned Legal Arguments, 116 in this case six out of
ten questions he asked related to Policy. Justice Alito generally asked Policy A questions,
exploring the implications of the case at hand, 117 and here four of his ten questions fell
into that category. He asked four Legal Argument questions, including the following:
“Well, could you have cross-petitioned in an effort to get damages, so if you had wanted
to preserve the issue, you surely could have done that, couldn’t you?” 118 Justice Alito’s
Policy A questions explored the limiting principle of the case, such as, “Well, on the
issue of consent, do you read the Ninth Circuit’s opinion as having an age limit? Suppose
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Camreta Oral Argument, supra note 34, at 32.
See supra Table 1.
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See Camreta Oral Argument, supra note 34, at 41.
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See supra Table 2.
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See supra Part IV.C.5.
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Camreta Oral Argument, supra note 34, at 50-51.
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Id. at 41.
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Id. at 51.
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See supra Table 1.
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See supra Part IV.C.6.
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See id.
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Camreta Oral Argument, supra note 34, at 48.
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that the child is, let’s say, 16 years old. Is the child at 16 incapable of consenting to
questioning?” 119
Justice Alito also asked a Policy B question about the legal principle that the Court
should adopt:
If you were designing what you would regard as an ideal system, and
you’re very knowledgeable in this . . . area, and you concluded that some
kind of approval by a detached individual should be required before
something like this is allowed, would you set the standard at probable
cause? 120
Justice Alito was not a very active questioner during oral arguments in the Sample, 121 but
he seemed to use the argument in Camreta as an opportunity to think through the legal
issues as well as to consider hypothetical situations. In general, he did not usually express
his own views about a case, which makes it difficult for arguing attorneys to anticipate or
address his concerns about their arguments.
Justice Sotomayor emerged as an active questioner during oral argument, and was
especially talkative in Camreta, asking sixteen questions instead of her average 11.1
questions per case (12.8% of the total questions asked in this case). 122 She rarely asked
Fact or Precedent questions, 123 and did not do so here. The vast majority of her questions
concerned Legal Arguments, and she was quite willing to challenge the advocates on
their positions. 124 She did so in Camreta, asking, “Doesn’t that go to the question of the
reasonableness of the scope of the seizure? Don’t we have . . . other jurisprudence that
basically addresses this question and says is this type of seizure or stop detention
reasonable?” 125
Justice Sotomayor’s other questions in Camreta deviated from her norm as
measured by the rest of the Sample, however. Ten of the sixteen questions she asked
concerned Policy (62.5% of her questions in the case). She asked several Policy A
questions, primarily focusing on the implications of the decision for law enforcement,
such as, “law enforcement is never going to know where the line of reasonableness or
unreasonableness is, is that correct?” 126 She then asked, “They can’t speak to the child
endlessly, can they?” 127
Justice Sotomayor’s concern for developing clear legal standards that can assist law
enforcement officers could be a function of her past experience as a prosecutor, 128 and
may not extend to other policy issues (in schools or otherwise). However, in Camreta she
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Id. at 36.
Id. at 52.
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See supra Table 1.
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This is in contrast to Justice Sotomayor’s average of 6.3% of questions asked in the 29 cases in which
she participated that were included in this Study. See id.
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See supra Part IV.C.7.
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See id.
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Camreta Oral Argument, supra note 34, at 44.
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Id. at 56.
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Id. at 57.
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Justice Sotomayor served as an assistant district attorney in New York from 1979-1984. See Biographies
of Current Justices of the Supreme Court, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES,
http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/biographies.aspx (last visited Sept. 23, 2012).
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was certainly interested in drawing a practical line. Her active involvement during oral
argument also gives advocates insights into her views, and the opportunity to address her
concerns directly. Brief writers and oral advocates can use those insights to anticipate
Justice Sotomayor’s questions or sticking points in petitions for writs of certiorari,
written briefs, and in preparation for oral argument.
Justice Kagan participated in just thirteen of the fifty-three cases in this Sample, so
it will be interesting to assess whether her questioning style evolves as she gains bench
experience over the coming terms. Because Justice Kagan served as Solicitor General of
the United States, 129 her familiarity with and experience in oral argument prior to joining
the Court may affect how she questions advocates and how active a questioner she
becomes.
The data gathered on Justice Kagan in this Study show that she was most likely to
ask questions to clarify Legal Arguments, but also dedicated about a quarter of her
questions to inquiries about the implications of the Court’s decision (Policy A). 130 She
asked only four questions in Camreta, but three questions concerned Legal Arguments,
and one concerned Policy A. The Policy A question that she asked was:
But, General, I take it that that problem disappears—tell me if I’m
wrong—if we find there’s no jurisdiction. If we Munsingwear this case,
the decision is wiped off the case, you return to status quo ante, and you
tell all your people that they can do what they would have done
beforehand; is that right? 131
Justice Kagan’s limited participation in Camreta as well as in the entire
Sample examined in this Study warrants tentative conclusions about her overall
approach to oral argument.
VI.

CONCLUSION

These findings show that the types of questions the Justices ask vary, and that
they differ in the extent to which they examine policy issues. Some members of the
Court, such as Justice Ginsburg, tend to probe the legal arguments, make certain to
address threshold issues and clarify facts, but are not policy-oriented. Others, such as
Justice Breyer, focus on the broad policy implications of a decision. Still others, such as
Justice Scalia, use the argument as a time to challenge the oral advocates, allowing the
lawyers to respond directly to the Justice’s own policy concerns.
Our data suggest that oral argument does serve an important purpose. With the
exception of Justice Thomas, all of the Justices took advantage of this opportunity to
actively question the arguing attorneys about a variety of aspects of the case. Such
exchanges between the attorneys and the Justices include consideration of the most
relevant precedents, a clarification of facts, an in-depth examination of legal arguments
and, most importantly, the opportunity for the Justices to explore the policy implications
129

Justice Kagan was confirmed as the 45th Solicitor General of the United States on March 19, 2009. See

id.
130
131

See supra Part IV.C.8.
Camreta Oral Argument, supra note 34, at 56.
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of their decisions. Oral argument also gives each Justice the chance to focus on the
element or elements of the case that troubles him or her the most, and gives the arguing
attorney the opportunity to address that Justice's concerns and perhaps win that vote. One
negative aspect of this process seems to be the time constraint of only thirty minutes of
argument per side. Given this very limited time period, not every Justice has the
opportunity to ask many questions, and Justices often interrupt one another, making it
extremely difficult for the arguing attorney to give thoughtful or expansive responses to
questions.
The extent to which the Justices are policy-oriented may differ depending on the
type of case before the Court. We found, for example, that the Justices asked more policy
questions in education cases than in non-education constitutional cases. In one recent
education case, Camreta v. Greene, 42.4% of the Justices’ questions concerned policy
(compared to the average of 34.8% of questions in the Sample as a whole). Each of the
eight active questioners asked questions about policy, and two Justices were especially
focused on this area: all of Justice Breyer’s questions in Camreta asked about policy, and,
though not in line with her questioning style in the rest of the Sample, Justice Sotomayor
concentrated the majority of her questions on policy. It would be beneficial to repeat this
Study with a larger sample of education cases as well as a sample of other types of cases
for purposes of comparison. For example, it may well be that the Court is more
concerned with policy in areas such as health care, where its decision in National
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius will have significant and immediate
effects on the lives of the majority of citizens, or in other areas of heightened political
salience such as free speech. While each of the Court’s decisions affects the primary
conduct of the litigants outside the bounds of the case, education and health care
(especially in terms of the scope of Congress’s commerce and taxing powers) are
examples of policy matters that necessarily impact nearly all Americans.
Oral argument plays a significant and unique role in the Supreme Court’s decisionmaking process, giving Justices the opportunity to ask questions about issues that are of
particular concern to them and that may not have been fully developed in the parties’
briefs. Examining the questions that the Justices ask during this process provides insight
into their thinking and their concern for the ramifications of their decisions. These
findings show that the Justices use oral argument to gather information about the policy
implications of their decisions by raising questions regarding the legal principles that the
Court should adopt, the courses of action the Court should take, or that reveal a Justice’s
beliefs about the content of public policy. The data also show that the Justices differ in
the extent that they explore these policy issues during oral argument, and the extent to
which they are willing to identify their own policy preferences. Critics of “judicial
activism” might argue that the policy focus at oral arguments demonstrates that the
Supreme Court is outside its constitutional power and inappropriately legislating from the
bench. But “policy” as defined in this Study encompasses questions that reflect the
Justices’ awareness of the fact that the Court does not make decisions in a vacuum, and is
carefully considering the impact of its decisions.
This Study does, of course, have limitations. First, the Sample of cases was not
randomly selected, thus limiting the ability to generalize the findings. Second, the cases
selected for study (those raising constitutional issues and those concerning education)
may be types of cases that are more likely to inspire a policy focus, given that they raise
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issues that are often of elevated societal interest and concern. In addition, Justices
Sotomayor and Kagan participated in far fewer oral arguments in the Sample than the
other seven Justices currently on the Court, so their results may be less reliable in a
broader context.
Future research should be conducted to include a larger sample of cases, ideally all
cases decided across a number of terms. In addition, it would be interesting to examine
each Justice's questioning style over time. For example, do any of the Justices become
more policy-oriented as they gain experience and confidence in their role on the Court? It
would also be helpful to study the behavior of lower court judges, both state and federal,
to see if their questioning styles display a similar focus on policy concerns.
With these limitations in mind, this Study still has practical implications. Attorneys
who argue before the Court can use these results to better prepare for their arguments by
being able to anticipate which aspects of the case will likely be of most significance to
each Justice. Attorneys who argue before the Court on a regular basis are certainly aware
of the Justices' patterns of questioning, and may even have gathered their own data to
better prepare for argument, but this Study gives attorneys making their first or only
argument insight into what to expect, and more seasoned arguers a broader perspective.
First-time arguing attorneys might well be surprised to know that much of their time in
argument will be devoted to examining the policy implications of the case, and, given
that fact, they should spend a considerable amount of time trying to formulate
hypothetical questions about the extension or application of the decision as well as
questions about the legal principles the Court should adopt, and the course of action the
Court should take in deciding the case. In preparing such hypothetical questions,
practitioners will want to consult the people who may be most affected by such a
decision; in the field of education, for example, they would want to prepare with people
such as school administrators. Finally, these data make clear that the Justices care about
the policy implications of their decisions, and that they use oral argument as a time to
explore those concerns.
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Appendix A: Oral Arguments Sample
October Term 2010 Cases Examined in this Study:
Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436 (2011) (argued Nov. 3, 2010)
Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011) (argued
Mar. 28, 2011)
Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355 (2011) (argued Feb. 22, 2011)
Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011) (argued Nov. 2, 2010)
Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct 2020 (2011) (argued Mar. 1, 2011)
Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350 (2011) (argued Oct. 6, 2010)
Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011) (argued Mar. 21, 2011)
Borough of Duryea, Pa. v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488 (2011) (argued Mar. 22, 2011)
Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849 (2011) (argued Jan. 12, 2011)
J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011) (argued Mar. 23, 2011)
Skinner v. Switzer, 131 S. Ct. 1289 (2011) (argued Oct. 13, 2010)
Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011) (argued Oct. 6, 2010)
Walker v. Martin, 131 S. Ct. 1120 (2011) (argued Nov. 29, 2010)
October Term 2009 Cases Examined in this Study:
Berghuis v. Smith, 130 S. Ct. 1382 (2010) (argued Jan. 20, 2010)
Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250 (2010) (argued Mar. 1, 2010)
Briscoe v. Virginia, 130 S. Ct. 1316 (2010) (argued Jan. 11, 2010)
Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of Law v. Martinez, 130 S.
Ct. 2971 (2010) (argued Apr. 19, 2010)
Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811 (2010) (argued Apr. 28, 2010)
Florida v. Powell, 130 S. Ct. 1195 (2010) (argued Dec. 7, 2009)
Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010) (argued Nov. 9, 2009)
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010) (argued Mar. 2, 2010)
City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010) (argued Apr. 19, 2010)
Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010) (argued Oct. 13, 2009)
Smith v. Spisak, 130 S. Ct. 676 (2010) (argued Oct. 13, 2009)
Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs and Trainmen Gen. Comm. of
Adjustment, Cent. Region, 130 S. Ct. 584 (2009) (argued Oct. 7, 2009)
United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010) (argued Jan. 12, 2010)
United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010) (argued Oct. 6, 2009)
October Term 2008 Cases Examined in this Study:
Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009) (argued Oct. 7, 2008)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (argued Dec. 10, 2008)
Bobby v. Bies, 556 U.S. 825 (2009) (argued Apr. 27, 2009)
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009) (argued March 3, 2009)
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (argued March 24, 2009)
Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449 (2009) (argued Dec. 9, 2008)
Dist. Attorney’s Office for the Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52 (2009)
(argued March 2, 2009)
Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 555 U.S. 246 (2009), (argued Dec. 2, 2008)
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Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230 (2009) (argued Apr. 28, 2009)
Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729 (2009) (argued Dec. 3, 2008)
Hedgpeth v. Pulido, 555 U.S. 57 (2008) (argued Oct. 15, 2008)
Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009) (argued Oct. 7, 2008)
Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433 (2009) (argued April 20, 2009)
Kansas v. Ventris, 556 U.S. 586 (2009) (argued Jan. 21, 2009)
Locke v. Karass, 555 U.S. 207 (2009) (argued Oct. 6, 2008)
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009) (argued Nov. 10, 2008)
Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778 (2009), (argued Jan. 13, 2009)
Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160 (2009) (argued Oct. 14, 2008)
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) (argued Oct. 14, 2008)
Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460 (2009) (argued Nov. 12, 2008)
Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City of Valdez, 557 U.S. 1 (2009) (argued April 1, 2009)
Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364 (2009) (argued Apr. 21, 2009)
Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335 (2009) (argued Nov. 5, 2008)
Waddington v. Sarausad, 555 U.S. 179 (2009) (argued Oct. 15, 2008)
Yeager v. United States, 557 U.S. 110 (2009) (argued Mar. 23, 2009)
Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass’n, 555 U.S. 353 (2009) (argued Nov. 3, 2008)
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Appendix B: Coding Guidelines
F: Facts
- Questions about the facts of the case: What happened? When?
- Page numbers: Where in the brief do you make that argument?
- Does not include questions about the case’s legal history
T: Threshold
- Questions about threshold issues
- Jurisdiction: Which court has the right to decide this issue?
P: Precedent
- Questions about whether a specified precedent applies
- Are you asking us to revisit that?
E: External Actors
- Questions about how outside parties would like the Court to decide
- Common examples of outside parties: Congress, state legislatures, police
L: Legal Argument
- Questions about petitioner’s/respondent’s argument
- Legal posture/history of the case at hand
- Underlying rationale of cases decided in the past
- Questions that reveal the Justice’s opinion on law (not policy)
Policy:
- A: Hypothetical questions and applications/extensions of the case at hand
o Questions about how this decision will be applied in the future
o Hypothetical fact patterns that would fall under this ruling
- B: Questions about legal principles that the Court should adopt
o The “nitty-gritty” description of a proposed rule
o Questions about the logistics of a potential test
- C: Questions about courses of action the Court should take
o Should the Court make a rule?
o Questions about what specifically the Court should do (not just rule in favor
of one party or another)
- D: Questions that reveal a Justice’s opinion on policy
o Must be very obvious that it’s an opinion
o “It seems to me…” is a good clue
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Appendix C: Content Variation
Table 1: Threshold (10 questions, 0.2% of total questions)
Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsburg
Antonin Scalia
John G. Roberts
Sonia Sotomayor
Elena Kagan
John Paul Stevens
Anthony Kennedy
David Souter
Clarence Thomas
Stephen Breyer
Samuel Alito

% of Threshold Questions
Asked (% of Individual
Justice’s Total Questions)
40.0% (0.6%)
30.0% (0.3%)
10.0% (0.1%)
10.0% (0.3%)
10.0% (0.9%)
0.0% (0.0%)
0.0% (0.0%)
0.0% (0.0%)
0.0% (0.0%)
0.0% (0.0%)
0.0% (0.0%)

Table 2: Precedent (31 questions, 0.6% of total questions)
Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsburg
John G. Roberts
Anthony Kennedy
Stephen Breyer
John Paul Stevens
David Souter
Samuel Alito
Sonia Sotomayor
Antonin Scalia
Clarence Thomas
Elena Kagan
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% of Precedent Questions
Asked (% of Individual
Justice’s Total Questions)
29.0% (1.4%)
25.8% (1.0%)
16.1% (1.0%)
9.7% (0.5%)
6.5% (0.6%)
6.5% (0.6%)
3.2% (0.2%)
3.2% (0.3%)
0.0% (0.0%)
0.0% (0.0%)
0.0% (0.0%)
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Table 3: Facts (369 questions, 7.2% of total questions)
Justice
Ruther Bader Ginsburg
Antonin Scalia
John G. Roberts
Stephen Breyer
Anthony Kennedy
John Paul Stevens
Samuel Alito
David Souter
Sonia Sotomayor
Elena Kagan
Clarence Thomas

% of Fact Questions Asked
(% of Individual Justice’s
Total Questions)
28.7% (16.7%)
23.0% (8.5%)
15.2% (7.0%)
10.6% (6.2%)
6.8% (4.8%)
5.7% (6.1%)
4.1% (3.7%)
3.5% (3.8%)
2.2% (2.5%)
0.3% (0.9%)
0.0% (0.0%)

Table 4: External Actors’ Preferences (25 questions, 0.5% of total questions)

Justice
Antonin Scalia
Anthony Kennedy
David Souter
Ruth Bader Ginsburg
John G. Roberts
John Paul Stevens
Stephen Breyer
Sonia Sotomayor
Clarence Thomas
Samuel Alito
Elena Kagan

% of External Actors’
Preferences Questions Asked
(% of Individual Justice’s
Total Questions)
16.0% (0.4%)
16.0% (0.8%)
16.0% (1.2%)
16.0% (0.6%)
16.0% (0.5%)
8.0% (0.6%)
8.0% (0.3%)
4.0% (0.3%)
0.0% (0.0%)
0.0% (0.0%)
0.0% (0.0%)

Table 5: Legal Argument (2873 questions, 56.2% of total questions)

Justice
Antonin Scalia
John G. Roberts
Ruth Bader Ginsburg
Stephen Breyer
Anthony Kennedy
Sonia Sotomayor
John Paul Stevens
Samuel Alito
David Souter
Elena Kagan
Clarence Thomas

% of Legal Argument
Questions Asked (% of
Individual Justice’s Total
Questions)
19.8% (56.6%)
15.4% (55.5%)
13.4% (60.7%)
10.9% (50.1%)
9.4% (51.9%)
7.8% (69.6%)
7.4% (61.4%)
7.1% (49.6%)
6.4% (53.5%)
2.5% (61.7%)
0.0% (0.0%)
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Table 6: Policy A (923 questions, 18.0% of total questions)
Justice
John G. Roberts
Antonin Scalia
Stephen Breyer
Samuel Alito
Anthony Kennedy
Ruth Bader Ginsburg
John Paul Stevens
Sonia Sotomayor
David Souter
Elena Kagan
Clarence Thomas

% of Policy A Questions
Asked (% of Individual
Justice’s Total Questions)
17.4% (20.2%)
16.0% (14.8%)
15.2% (22.3%)
14.8% (33.5%)
10.5% (18.7%)
8.0% (11.7%)
6.1% (16.2%)
5.1% (14.6%)
3.9% (10.5%)
2.9% (23.5%)
0.0% (0.0%)

Table 7: Policy B (248 questions, 4.8% of total questions)
Justice
Stephen Breyer
John G. Roberts
David Souter
Antonin Scalia
Anthony Kennedy
Ruth Bader Ginsburg
Samuel Alito
Sonia Sotomayor
John Paul Stevens
Elena Kagan
Clarence Thomas

% of Policy B Questions
Asked (% of Individual
Justice’s Total Questions)
15.7% (6.2%)
13.7% (4.3%)
13.3% (9.6%)
12.5% (3.1%)
12.5% (6.0%)
8.1% (3.2%)
8.1% (4.9%)
6.0% (4.7%)
5.6% (4.1%)
4.4% (9.6%)
0.0% (0.0%)

Table 8: Policy C (165 questions, 3.2% of total questions)
Justice
Antonin Scalia
Stephen Breyer
John G. Roberts
Anthony Kennedy
David Souter
Ruth Bader Ginsburg
Sonia Sotomayor
Samuel Alito
John Paul Stevens
Clarence Thomas
Elena Kagan
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% of Policy C Questions
Asked (% of Individual
Justice’s Total Questions)
20.0% (3.3%)
17.6% (4.6%)
15.0% (3.1%)
12.1% (3.8%)
8.5% (4.1%)
7.9% (2.1%)
7.3% (3.7%)
6.1% (2.4%)
5.5% (2.6%)
0.0% (0.0%)
0.0% (0.0%)
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Table 9: Policy D (471 questions, 9.2% of total questions)
Justice
Antonin Scalia
Anthony Kennedy
John G. Roberts
Stephen Breyer
David Souter
John Paul Stevens
Samuel Alito
Ruth Bader Ginsburg
Sonia Sotomayor
Elena Kagan
Clarence Thomas

% of Policy D Questions
Asked (% of Individual
Justice’s Total Questions)
27.8% (13.1%)
14.4% (13.1%)
14.0% (8.3%)
13.0% (9.7%)
12.1% (16.7%)
6.2% (8.4%)
4.9% (5.6%)
4.0% (3.0%)
2.8% (4.0%)
0.8% (3.5%)
0.0% (0.0%)
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